We study two forms of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players, one classical and other quantum. In its classical form making a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated to do so. However in its quantum form the advantage is lost and players are left with no motivation to make coalition.
Introduction
Recent developments in quantum game theory [1, 2, 3] have established quantum role in non-cooperative game theory. Nash equilibrium (NE), a concept originating from analysis of non-cooperative games has attracted much attention in study of quantum games. Quantum aspects have also been shown relevant in refinement notions of NE idea [4, 5] but these as well are about non-cooperative games. It arises a natural and interesting question: what is the quantum role in cooperative games?.In contrast to non-cooperative games the cooperative games allow players to form coalitions, compensations, make side payments etc. To introduce quantum aspects in these games we rely on concepts and ideas of von Neumann's cooperative game theory [6] .
In the usual analysis a useful quantity called value of a coalition [7] is introduced as a measure of worth the coalition possesses. Value of coalition is characterized as the payoff which the coalition can assure for itself by selecting an appropriate strategy, whereas the 'odd man' can prevent the coalition from getting more than this amount. Using this idea we study cooperative games in quantum settings. The preferable scheme to us to play a quantum game has been proposed recently by Marinatto and Weber [3] . In this scheme an initial quantum state is prepared by an arbiter and forwarded to players. Each player possesses two quantum unitary operators i.e. identity and Pauli spin-flip. Players apply the operators with classical probabilities on the initial quantum state and send the state back to the arbiter who then proceeds for a measurement to decide payoffs the players should get. Interestingly, the classical game can be reproduced when the initial quantum state becomes unentangled [3] . Classical game, therefore, is embedded in the quantum game.
In earlier papers [4, 5, 8] we showed that the arbiter can change properties like stability of NE by changing parameters of the initial quantum state. For example, an unstable NE in classical game becomes a stable NE when the arbiter forwards the initial quantum state in some particular form. Because classical game corresponds to an unentangled initial state it becomes possible that stability of a NE changes as the game switches from classical to one of its quantum forms.
In this paper using again Marinatto and Weber's scheme [3] we find a quantum form of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players. In classical form of this game any two players out of three get an advantage when they successfully form a coalition and play same strategy. We find a quantum form of this game where the advantage for coalition forming is lost and players are left with no motivation to cooperate.
2 A three player symmetric cooperative game
Classical form
A classical three person normal form game [7] is given by three non-empty sets Σ A , Σ B , and Σ C , the strategy sets of the players A,B, and C and three real valued functions P A , P B , and P C defined on Σ A × Σ B × Σ C . The product space Σ A × Σ B × Σ C is the set of all tuples (σ A , σ B , σ C ) with σ A ∈ Σ A , σ B ∈ Σ B and σ C ∈ Σ C . A strategy is understood as such a tuple (σ A , σ B , σ C ) and P A , P B , P C are payoff functions of the three players. The game is usually denoted as Γ = {Σ A , Σ B , Σ C ; P A , P B , P C }. Let ℜ = {A, B, C} be the set of players and ℘ be an arbitrary subset of ℜ. The players in ℘ may form a coalition so that, for all practical purposes, the coalition ℘ appears as a single player. It is expected that players in ℜ − ℘ will form an opposing coalition and the game has two opposing "coalition players" i.e. ℘ and ℜ − ℘.
We study quantum version of an example of a classical three player cooperative game discussed in ref. [7] . Each of three players A, B, C chooses one of the two strategies 1, 2. If the three players choose the same strategy there is no payoff; otherwise, the two players who have chosen the same strategy receive one unit of money each from the 'odd man.' Payoff functions P A , P B , P C for players A, B, C are given by [7] P A (1, 1, 1) = P A (2, 2, 2) = 0
with similar expressions for P B and P C . Suppose ℘ = {B, C}; hence ℜ − ℘ = {A}. The coalition game represented by Γ ℘ is given by the following payoff matrix [7] [1] 
It is seen that the mixed strategies
are optimal for ℘ and ℜ − ℘ respectively. With these strategies a payoff 1 for players ℘ is assured for all strategies of the opponent; hence, the value of the coalition υ(Γ ℘ ) is 1, that is, υ({B, C}) = 1. Since Γ is a zero sum game the value υ(Γ ℘ ) can also be used to find the value υ(Γ ℜ−℘ ) = υ({A}) = −1. The game is also symmetric and we can write
Quantum form
Now we come to a quantum form of this game. In quantum form of this three player game the players implement their strategies by applying the identity operators in their possession with probabilities p, q, and r respectively on the initial quantum state. In Marinatto and Weber's scheme [3] the Pauli spin-flip operator σ is then applied with probabilities (1 − p), (1 − q), and (1 − r) by three players respectively. In case ρ in is density matrix that corresponds to initial quantum state the density matrix after players have played their strategies can be written as [8] 
Let the arbiter prepares following initial quantum state to be unitarily manipulated later by three players
c ijk |ijk , where
where basic vectors of a general three qubit quantum state are
The state (8) can be imagined as a global state (in a 3 ⊗ 3 dimensional Hilbert space) of three two-state quantum systems or 'qubits'. Each qubit is manipulated by one player during his 'strategy' operation. Associated density matrix to the quantum state |ψ in is
Let the matrix of three player game be given by 24 constants α t , β t , γ t with 1 ≤ t ≤ 8 [8] . Payoff operators for players A, B, and C are [3] :
Payoffs to players A, B, and C are [3] P A,B,C (p, q, r) = trace (P A,B,C ) oper ρ f in
Payoff to player A, for example, can be written as
where T is for transpose and Ω, ∆, and Υ are matrices defined as
The cooperative game with the classical payoff functions P A , P B , P C for players A B C respectively given in eq. (1) together with the definition of payoff operators for these players in eq. (11) imply that
and the payoff to player A given in eq. (12) can be written as For a symmetric three players game we need
i.e. payoff to a player depends on his/her strategy and not on his/her identity. Note that P A (p, q, r) becomes same as P A (p, r, q) when
i.e. the payoff to a p player remains same when other two players interchange their strategies. The conditions (17) hold if together with eqs. (18) following relations are also true
Now with the requirements of eqs. (17) no subscript in a payoff expression is, therefore, needed and P (p, q, r) represents the payoff to a p player against two other players playing q and r.
With the symmetric game conditions of eqs. (18) the payoff to a p player against q, r players can now be written as
In this symmetric quantum game suppose the coalition ℘ plays the following mixed strategy
where we suppose that pure strategy [1] ⇒ p = 0 i.e.
[11] means that both players in the coalition ℘ apply the identity operator I with zero probability. Similarly let [2] ⇒ p = 1 i.e. [22] means that players in the coalition ℘ apply the identity operator I with unit probability. Now the strategy of the coalition in eq. (21) means that ℘ plays [11] with probability l and [22] with probability 1 − l. Similarly let the player in ℜ − ℘ plays following mixed strategy
In this case the payoff to coalition ℘ is obtained as
where P ℘[111] is the payoff to ℘ when all three players play p = 0 i.e. the strategy [1] . Similarly P ℘[221] is coalition payoff when coalition players play p = 1 and the player in ℜ − ℘ plays p = 0. Now from eq. (20) we get
Therefore from eq. (23)
To find value of coalition υ(Γ ℘ ) in the quantum game we find ∂P℘ ∂m and equate it to zero i.e. P ℘ is such a payoff to ℘ that the player in ℜ − ℘ cannot change it by changing his strategy given in eq. (22). It gives, interestingly, l = [22] also becomes optimal in quantum game as well. However in the quantum game the coalition now secures following payoff, also termed as the value of the coalition
Similarly we get the value of ℜ − ℘ as
Note that these values reduce to their classical counterparts of eq. (6) 
Note that P (p, q, r) + P (q, p, r) + P (r, p, q) = 0 and classical mixed strategy game is zero sum and P (℘) + P (ℜ − ℘) = 0. However the quantum version of this game is no more zero sum because now from eq. (20) we have P (p, q, r) + P (q, p, r) + P (r, p, q) = 8(p + q + r − pq − qr − rp) − 6 (28) and the quantum game becomes zero sum when p + q + r − pq − qr − rp = 
Conclusion
We considered a symmetric cooperative game played by three players in classical and quantum forms. In classical form of this game, which is also embedded in the quantum form, forming a coalition gives advantage to players and players are motivated to do so. In quantum form of the game, however, an initial quantum state can be prepared by the arbiter such that coalition forming is of no advantage. The interesting function in these situations i.e. 'value of coalition' is greater for coalition then for player outside; when the game is played classically. These values become same in a quantum form of the game and motivation to form a coalition is lost. There is, nevertheless, an essential difference between the two forms of the game i.e. classical game is zero sum but its quantum version is not.
